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One must spend some time with this work for Professor Bittker's accomplishment to sink in. It is staggering to have compressed so much learning into the space of four volumes. Now that
this work has appeared, it is impossible to imagine engaging in a
tax practice without it. Indeed, it is nearly possible to imagine engaging in tax practice with nothing else. A treatise can earn its
keep if it steers us even occasionally to a sorely needed answer.
Professor Bittker's new treatise will do so often, and will also provide some undiscounted intellectual pleasure along the way.
In his preface, Professor Bittker tells us that he has aimed to
lay bare "structure" and "principal effects" rather than turn over
every stone littering the tax terrain.1 The treatise never gives us
less than this promise, and often more. There are, of course, asppects of the income tax system-a few entire segments and many
more details-that escape Professor Bittker's scrutiny. This was
inevitable since the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code now contain as many words as any one of Professor Bittker's
four volumes. Add the Treasury Regulations to the scales, and the
entire treatise is comfortably exceeded in length by the law it
expounds.
Despite the inevitable limitations imposed by space, however,
the eighty-two chapters already published' provide an overview of
nearly all the areas of income tax that lawyers in general practice
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
I 1 B. BriTrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOMz, EsTATs AND GIars vii (1981).
2The outline of the work now allows for 119 chapters. Thirty-seven have been reserved.
Id. at xv-xix. A fifth volume, on estate and gift taxation, is forthcoming.
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can ever expect to face. Even tax specialists will find that considerable time will elapse between problems not encompassed by this
treatise. Ultimately, of course, only time and the experience of its
readers can confirm the virtues of this work. But I think I take
little risk in predicting that it will be a classic.
I
There is an inference from the very undertaking of a treatise,
further abetted in this case by the visible concern of the treatise
with fundamentals, that Professor Bittker has aimed for a work of
permanence. In this he faced the bane of treatise writers: the impermanence of the law.* Americans are, as peoples go, among the
readiest to adopt new religions and new tax laws. Since the first
four volumes of Bittker's treatise appeared last year, there have
been no fewer than four major tax enactments' and a number of
minor ones.4 In the summer of 1981, within months of the appearance of the treatise, Congress produced a law5 that at once tamed
the thrust of progressive taxation for individuals,6 introduced entirely new principles of cost recovery for business assets,7 exempted most Americans working abroad from United States
* [EDITORS' NoT: This phenomenon is occasionally the bane of reviewers and law review editors as well. After this issue went to press, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 51 U.S.L.W. 5 (1982) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which substantially modified legislation passed only last
year. Professor Isenbergh's discussion of recent tax enactments accordingly does not include
changes wrought by the 1982 Act.]
3 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"), Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)); Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1982)); Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat.
2599 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)); Installment Sales
Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)).
4 I.R.C. § 66 (1982) (abandoned spouses); id. § 195 (amortization of start-up expenditures); id. § 274(h) (foreign convention expenses); id. § 861(e) (source of income from certain
aircraft); Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-603, 94 Stat. 3503 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982)) (qualified foreign pension plans).
5 ERTA, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.CA.
(West Supp. 1982)).
6 Id. § 101(a), 95 Stat. at 176-82 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1982)) (maximum
marginal rate of 50% for all taxpayers; "mostmiddle class incomes taxed in range between
40% and 50%).
7 Id. § 201(a), 95 Stat. at 203-19 (codified at I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982)). Coupled
with a special provision for the sale of tax benefits between corporations, id. § 201(a), 95
Stat. at 214-16 (codified at I.R.C. § 168(f(8) (West Supp. 1982)), the new cost-recovery
regime effectively repeals the corporate income tax for capital-intensive industries.
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taxes," and removed all but large estates from the reach of transfer
taxes.' The full effect of these changes, even should they survive
further statutory modification, will be years in the unfolding.10
It compounds the task of a treatise writer that different observers necessarily have different vantage points on the tax system.
Lawyers, tax reformers, economists, and ordinary taxpayers are apt
to respond to the 1981 changes in their own ways. As embodiments
of tax policy, the recent changes are a breathtaking measure of
shifting political tides. The new regime is especially striking
against the background of the Tax Reform Acts of 196911 and
1976,12 which together represent the statutory high water mark of
the "tax reform" movement. 1969 and 1976 marched under the
banner of various equities, both vertical and horizontal, of curbing
abuse, closing shelters, and aligning taxes more squarely with the
true economic benefits received by taxpayers. 1981 rises under the
sign of supply: cut taxes everywhere and watch productivity swell
in their wake.13

8 Id. § 111(a), 95 Stat. at 190-94 (codified at LR.C. § 911(b) (West Supp. 1982)) (allowance, increased to $95,000 by 1986, and housing costs excluded from taxable income of
Americans residing abroad).
I Id. §§ 401(a), 403(d), 95 Stat. at 299-300, 301-05 (codified at LR.C. §§ 2010, 2056
(West Supp. 1982)). The unified credit allowing tax-free transfers up to $600,000, in conjunction with an unlimited marital deduction, allows estates of up to $1,200,000 to escape
taL

t2 The first cumulative supplement to Professor Bittker's treatise fully reflects these
statutory changes. B. BrrrK, supra note 1 (Cur. Supp. No. 1, 1982) (text, tables, & index
voL).
. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1976)).
" Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1976)).
13The survival of some of the 1976 rules in a Code now adorned with supply-side provisions sometimes creates a curiously mottled statutory pattern. For example, the 1976 Act
placed stringent limitations, amounting nearly to a prohibition, on the transfer by sale of
tax benefits in the form of loss carry-forwards from losing enterprises to successful ones. Id.
§ 806(e), 90 Stat. at 1599-1605 (codified at I.R.C. § 382 (1976)). For those who feel strongly
about economic efficiency (and one tends to meet more of them these days) this is a dubious
idea.
If we assume that the tax system should distort investment decisions as little as possible, a more forgiving view of trading in tax losses seems better. Under the 1976 limitations,
some firms, especially young and undiversified ones (those least likely to have any use for
tax benefits not transferable to others), may be denied any tax benefit for some portion of
their losses. To the extent that these benefits are denied to investors (who will of course be
taxed in full on their gains), investors are in effect risking whole dollars to make dollars
diminished by taxation, whereas in a tax-free world they would stand to gain or lose dollars
of the same value. Under the 1976 limitations on the transfer of tax losses, therefore, the
initial decision by some firms to invest may be different from the one that would be made in
a tax-free world. For a persuasive analysis of this problem, see Campisano & Romano, Re-
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Changes in the basic thrust of our tax system are not likely to
cause tax lawyers much concern, however. For them, there is a living to be made by aligning the interests of clients with the movements of the Code, however jagged or circuitous these turn out to
be. A change in the law with momentous effects on the tax environment-for example, a halving of all rates-would pass nearly
unnoticed by practitioners if it left much of the inner plumbing of
the Code undisturbed.
In his treatise, Professor Bittker responds principally to the
needs of those who use the Code rather than those who make it.
He does not set himself up as a prophet of tax policy or public
finance, although the treatise contains admirable introductory
chapters on both.14 He has staked eminently practical ground,
which will assure a large readership at the outset, but where it is
hardest to preserve a work from unplanned obsolescence.
Even within the terrain of workaday tax lawyers, however,
some questions are nearer the core of the tax system than others
and are likely to remain of more permanent concern. These perennial questions include the nature of income, the tax benefit principle, annual accounting, recovery of capital, realization, claim of
right, the timing of income and deductions, and so on. WIN credits
and Asset Depreciation Ranges may come and go, but some basic
notions will survive as long as income remains the basis of our tax
system. An understanding of these notions-some of which I had
the good fortune to encounter first at the losing end of Socratic
exchanges with Professor Bittker himself-makes up the indispensable knowledge and intuition of tax lawyers. Professor Bittcouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 709 (1981).
The 1981 Act, reflecting different biases, cuts much the other way and allows corporations freely to sell tax benefits resulting from its generous allowances for capital recovery.
See supra note 7. This possibility results from an extreme relaxation of the rules governing
leases of property. Under the 1981 Act, agreements between corporations will be recognized
as "leases" for tax purposes regardless of their economic or legal character for other purposes. ERTA § 201 (codified at I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(A) & (F) (West Supp. 1982)). Thus a
corporation can become the "owner" and ostensible lessor of business assets, thereby obtaining the tax benefits of capital recovery, without having the usual economic or legal attributes of ownership. Such agreements can be structured to produce the same effect as a
transfer of tax benefits from one corporation to another for a fee. These sales of tax allowances may permit young and undiversified firms, or old and ailing ones, to derive benefit

from what might otherwise be accumulations of losses made useless by the Code's limitations on transfers of losses. The 1976 rules were not repealed, however, so the Code still
purports to limit the survival of loss carry-forwards of corporations whose stock has changed
hands. The 1981 rules are an overlay on the prior rules that allows a partial end run around
them.
14 1 B. BrrrKER, supra note 1, chs. 1-4.
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ker's treatise will last, I believe, because of its systematic concern
for these basic themes of taxation.
H
Among the tax perennials, one especially persistent question is
how the tax laws should be applied to transactions that appear
designed to defeat them. Most major statutes raise problems of interpretation, of course, but the quest for "substance" through the
distracting haze of "form" has attracted a particularly intense
scrutiny in tax matters.15
As a starting point, there is almost universal assent among tax
lawyers and theorists that the revenues should not be defeated by
certain entirely artificial maneuvers. We are assured-and it would
be hard to demur-that the "substance" of events should determine their tax consequences and that any other principle would
expose the Treasury to obvious manipulations. Certain presumptions, generally favoring the Treasury, are thought to flow from the
order of things. Both on matters of fact and interpretation, a taxpayer must sustain a position once challenged by the tax authorities, and that burden is entirely reasonable.1 6
The harder question, however, is the nature of the defense the
taxpayer must produce. From a clean slate, it might be thought
sufficient for the taxpayer to show that a transaction, fairly characterized, is encompassed by the statute and that the statute, by its
terms, yields the desired result. Things are not so simple, though,
and much has been made to turn on the nature of the taxpayer's
desire. There has developed a welter of rules and extrastatutory
standards that impose particular scrutiny on transactions with results unfavorable to the Treasury. These standards are enshrined
20
1 8 Bazley,19 Earl,
17 Court Holding,
in celebrated cases-Gregory,
Goldstein2"-that stand as bulwarks against overreaching by taxpayers. It is from these cases that the basic weapons in the Com16 One man's tax shelter being everyone else's budget deficit, all taxpayers ultimately
have an interest in the reasonable interpretation of the tax laws.
. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
17 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying
text.
IS Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). See infra notes 50-65 and
accompanying text.
' Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
2o Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
21- Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967). See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
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missioner's arsenal are derived-the business purpose doctrine, the
step transaction doctrine, "substance over form," and others. The
effect of these doctrines is the existence alongside the Internal
Revenue Code of an additional (and somewhat autonomous) set of
principles for deciding tax disputes.
Professor Bittker is a faithful reporter of these doctrines. He
recognizes that a number of principles extrinsic to the Code (narrowly conceived) now govern its application.22 There remains the
question of the intellectual force of these principles in their present sway. On this question-perhaps the question among tax perennials-Bittker takes a restrained position, a posture fully justified, however, by the stated object of his work.
Professor Bittker starts from the readily accepted limitations
of pure literalism: words shorn of all context are not always selfconstruing. 8 From there he proceeds to a description of the prevalent doctrines. He describes the judicial search for "substance" in
tax matters with a caution bordering on detachment.2 ' If one had
to infer Bittker's own views on the issue, however, one might be
able to extract from the pages of his treatise a lukewarm endorsement of the general approach taken by the courts in this area. But
perhaps I find this so only because Professor Bittker describes in
mild tones doctrines and cases at which I balk. Certainly nothing
in Professor Bittker's goal of being "concise, lucid, and accurate"' 5
required him to betray any intellectual uneasiness aroused by the
doctrines he relates.
To Professor Bittker's dispassionate summary of the law I
cannot resist adding my own view that several of the touchstone
cases on form and substance in taxation are flawed in principle and
serve neither taxpayers nor the Treasury. What follows here, in
support of this view, is an excursion-dotted with a few generalizations-through a handful of cases widely regarded as embodying
important glosses on'the Internal Revenue Code.
III
The source of the problem is that the tax laws necessarily have
a limited number of terms, but must be applied to a nearly unlimited range of transactions. Many of the basic terms of the Code are
therefore imported into it with their contours already set. For ex11

1 B. BrrTKmR, supra note 1, at 4-18 to 4-25.

23 Id. at 4-2.

24Id. at 4-18 to 4-56.
25Id. at vii.
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ample, the Code taxes a "sale" without defining what a sale is;2 '

business and commercial experience supply that knowledge. In the
terms of Welch v. Helvering,27 life tells us what a sale is. It follows
that someone who has engaged in a transaction more reasonably
characterized as a license or a lease cannot make it a "sale" simply
by writing that word at the top of an agreement. The point is simple enough: where the Code follows life, life is determinative. The
underlying idea-that it does not matter what things are called-is
common to all law. No label can make a diamond of a rhinestone.
This principle is more than sufficient to defeat transactions that
are simply shams.
In addition to reflecting the world, statutes are also creatures
of art that impose their own form on the world. The Internal Revenue Code tells us that a "dividend" is a distribution by a corporation out of the profits of the current taxable year.' That being so,
it makes no difference that the corporation may have lost money
from its operations overall and that an economist might assure us
that a distribution in such circumstances was a return of capital. A
distribution out of current profits is a dividend because the statute
says so.
In almost all statutes one finds an amalgam of references to
the world and relations created by the statute itself; a mixture, if
you will, of life and art. Finding and isolating these two elements is
much of what the problem of form and substance is about. The
normal process of applying a statute to a transaction consists in
determining first, where the statute responds to the transaction,
and second, what this response does to the transaction itself.
Things become difficult when life imitates art, as it often does.
When someone calls a dog a cow and then seeks a subsidy provided
by statute for cows, the obvious response is that this is not what
the statute means. It may also happen that rich people who would
not otherwise have cows buy them to gain cow subsidies. Here,
when people say (as they do) that this is not what the statute
means, they are in fact saying something quite different.
Many of the difficulties that bedevil the pursuit of "substance" and "form" in taxation stem from the assimilation of these
§ 1001 (1976).
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

SI.R.C.

" The "sham transaction" doctrine means nothing more than that labels are not determinative. The term itself is used loosely, though, and in some cases is invoked in connection
with doctrines of broader reach. E.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934),
aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see infra notes 33, 48.
' I.R.C. § 316 (1976).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:859

two patterns. From the beginning of taxation people have sought
advantage in calling one thing another. To avoid a tax imposed on
compensation, for example, people would call it a gift.3 0 The principle of following "substance" rather than "form" has always
meant sweeping aside pretenses of this sort.
In another class of cases what was done apparently falls within
the statute, but results in a bad thing. 1 Although they differ
among themselves on what constitute "bad things," people dislike
them enough to strain to suppress them when possible. Many bad
things, however, are precisely what they purport to be, and therefore cannot be swept aside as shams. Here the inclination of one
who feels strongly is to invoke some more general feature of the
law, for example the "intent" (or perhaps nowadays the "deep
structure"3 2 ) of the statute, to conclude that the bad thing ought
not to be.
The Treasury, naturally enough, regards the reduction of tax
obligations as a ubiquitous bad thing. Because there are many different ways of engaging in transactions with roughly similar ends,
some more heavily taxed than others, the world in the Treasury's
view is a mosaic of bad things. None of this is at all surprising.
More surprising, however, is the success the Treasury has had in
litigation in establishing that the problem of distinguishing between transactions fairly characterized and impostors is the same
sort of intellectual problem as the difference between good and bad
things generally, and that both fall within the general rubric of
form and substance.
IV
One of the cases that opened this path for the Treasury, and
also perhaps the case most widely invoked as a source of first principles on form and substance, is Helvering v. Gregory.3 In Greg10 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1960); Noel v. Parrott,
15 F.2d 669, 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
31 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1005 (1967); see infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
'

See Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation:Dividend Distributions,85 YALE L.J.

861 (1976); infra note 89.

69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), a/I'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Gregory was by no means the
first case to attempt a standard for wresting substance from the jaws of form. Earlier Su-

preme Court opinions from the pen of Justice Holmes had asserted that tax disputes should
not turn on "technicalities," "attenuated subtleties," or "the refinements of title," but on
the "import and reasonable construction of the taxing act" or "actual command over the
property taxed." Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114
(1930); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 165 (1925). In these cases, however, Holmes simply
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ory, assets had been separated from a corporation by the creation
and distribution of shares of a second corporation, a transaction
ostensibly meeting the requirements of a "reorganization" under
the Revenue Act of 1928. 3 As such, the separation of assets would
be tax-free, and the subsequent liquidation of the second corporation would give rise to capital gains in the hands of the shareholder
who had received the distribution of shares. The result of the
transaction, however, was the same as a simple dividend distribution, and the Commissioner sought to tax it as such.
For the Board of Tax Appeals, the problem in Gregory was
whether this transaction should be measured by life or by art.sa
The distribution of shares fitted precisely within the definition of a
tax-free "reorganization" in the 1928 Act. The statute did more
than merely attach tax consequences to the occurrence of a "reorganization"; it purported to say what the term "reorganization"
meant. The Board of Tax Appeals thought it inescapable to regard
the notion of "reorganization" as a creature of the statute itself,
and concluded that a reorganization was precisely what had occurred.36 Judge Sternhagen's opinion rested on the principle that
"a statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal
expression of the taxing policy and leaves only the small interstices
for judicial consideration.

37

The Second Circuit, with Learned

Hand writing for a panel of judges of great intellectual prestige,sa
reversed in a decision that has left echoes in every corner of the
tax law. 9
A difficulty with Gregory is that these echoes reflect an opinion of greater literary power than sharpness of doctrine. There are
two strands in Gregory, corresponding roughly to the two different
views of form and substance sketched above. At the outset, Gregfound in broader principles of interpretation confirmation of a technical analysis already
unfavorable to the taxpayer. At least as a matter of tone, though, the Holmes opinions leave
open the possibility that the terms of the statute (narrowly conceived) might in a proper
case give way to other considerations.
" Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 791, 818 (repealed 1934); id. § 112(i),
45 Stat. at 818 (current version at LR.C. § 368(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)). The question might

well have been asked whether the overall transaction arose under a "plan" of "reorganization" as required by section 112(g) of the Act, the requirement of a "plan" being arguably in
addition to the requirement that a transaction qualify as a "reorganization," but the point
was apparently not made.
Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934),
aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
s'Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 225.

Judges Thomas W. Swan and Augustus N. Hand sat with Hand.
31

69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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ory raises the question whether the notion of a "reorganization" in
the 1928 Act is simply a creature of the statute or whether it imports something from life-life in this case being the world of business in which "reorganizations" occur. Within the terms of the
statute, the taxpayer had a winning case because she had done everything the statute required. If, however, we view the statute not
as an exhaustive definition of reorganizations but as incorporating
something from the world of business, the government had a
strong case. Certainly what happened in Gregory did not much
look like the sort of adjustment of a business that the notion of a
"reorganization" would bring to mind if derived from the business
world and not solely from the statute.
If the question in Gregory is so framed, the case is a close one.
Having said that the case was close, though, I also think the Board
of Tax Appeals decided it correctly. The 1928 Act clearly pur*ported to define reorganizations. 40 The contrast with the Revenue
Act of 1921, which purported only to enumerate certain transactions included within the term "reorganization, 4 1 cuts against any
suggestion that the language of the 1928 Act was accidental and
not entitled to full effect. 42 Certainly the IRS would not have acknowledged as a "reorganization" any transaction falling outside
the statutory range but similar in business effect. The definition of
a "reorganization" in the statute happened to be broad enough to
include transactions similar in pattern to the reorganizations conducted in the world, even though they aimed at different ends.
Seen as a case on the scope of the term "reorganization" in the
1928 Act, Gregory, whether rightly or wrongly decided, is not doctrinally startling. The term "reorganization" had already been
found, in earlier cases on continuity of shareholder interest, to be
bounded to some extent by its antecedents in the world.43 Judge
Hand's oft-cited metaphor that "a melody is more than the
notes"44 essentially reasserts this and might have been sufficient to
set aside Mrs. Gregory's transaction as too sterile to amount to a
4o Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i)(1), 45 Stat. 791, 818 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1) (1976)).
41 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1) (1976)).
41 The legislative history is not particularly helpful, beyond suggesting that a definition
of reorganizationsis indeed what Congress intended.
4 See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 469-70 (1933);
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
288 U.S. 599 (1933).
4 Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811.
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reorganization in the business sense.
There are, however, two sentences in the case that enlarge its
reach: "But the underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct
of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to
its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders' taxes is not one of the
transactions contemplated as corporate 'reorganizations.' ',5 These
sentences contain in germ a theory of business purpose and tax
avoidance. Although the boundaries of these notions do not emerge
fully drawn, the intentions underlying the two are obviously linked
in this passage, the latter becoming more sinister in the absence of
the former. The "venture in hand" must be the conduct of the underlying business of the corporation from which the distribution
was made."
As an abstract proposition, it is not immediately obvious why
a division of corporate assets would have to be germane to the conduct of the remaining business or even what it means to be germane. Businesses might well be perfectly indifferent whether other
assets were held in corporate solution along with them, and will
hardly be affected whether a separation of assets occurs by reorganization or by dividend. The second sentence, of course, largely
clarifies what is meant by "germane" in its suggestion that the end
of a reorganization as such cannot be tax avoidance.
This also is far from self-evident, however, for the whole point
of the reorganization provisions in the Code is to make certain
transactions tax-free. To be sure, the range of dividend taxation is
cut back as a result; but it was in response to patterns otherwise
taxed as dividends that the reorganization provisions came into being in the first place.
The transaction in Gregory was doubtless economically
equivalent to a dividend distribution, and to that extent the reorganization served principally to avoid the more onerous dividend
tax. As a basis for resolving matters of form and substance, however, economic equivalence is untenable. The Code creates numerous tax differences between economically equivalent transactions.
The very decision to incorporate a business often entails a choice
between two economically equivalent ways of pursuing a profit.

45 Id.
4" To

treat the "venture in hand" as the reorganization itself makes Hand's statement
meaningless.
" E.g., I.R.C. §§ 302, 305 (1976) (same result achieved by stock redemption or by stock
dividend taxed respectively as capital gain or dividend).
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Whatever its precise boundaries, the inquiry of the court in
Gregory remained whether the thing done fell within the statute.
In resolving that question, Judge Hand apparently found in the
tax laws a generalized requirement that a reorganization be free of
certain bad features. This can be restated more broadly as a principle that where the character of a corporate transaction is ambiguous, the Code somehow "prefers" a dividend to a capital gain, the
latter being a matter of grace. So viewed, Gregory can be treated as
a fairly traditional exercise in statutory interpretation. The opinion itself concluded squarely that Mrs. Gregory's transaction did
not fall within the statutory term "reorganization" and was therefore a "sham. '48 The Supreme Court's affirmance seized particularly on this aspect of the case and, by repeatedly characterizing
the underlying transaction as a "device," a "masquerad[e]," or an
"artifice," tended
to bring Gregory back within the range of
"sham" cases. 49
On balance, however, it is hard to view Gregory as simply a
sham transaction case. Even though Judge Hand ostensibly operated entirely within the statute, the specific definitions of the 1928
Act ultimately surrendered to an almost open-ended statement of
statutory purpose as the basis for decision.
V
Subsequent decisions have found in Gregory a broad mandate
to attack perceived "bad" features of transactions, however firmly
anchored within the terms of the Code. Reflecting perhaps the two
strands within Gregory, a pattern common to many of the important later cases on "form" and "substance" is the coexistence
within them of a narrow and a broad holding. The narrow holding
is usually the ferreting out of some sham or other that justifies a
recasting of a transaction. The broad holding is typically the assertion of some overriding principle of taxation that denies the taxpayer the wanted result, even assuming a transaction perfectly
fitted within the terms of the statute.
Generalizing about these cases, one can say that in their nar48 69 F.2d at 811. Judge Hand, in later pronouncements about Gregory, was often at
pains to construe it as a simple "sham" case. See Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15
(2d Cir. 1935) (question in the Supreme Court's opinion in Gregory was whether transaction
was in fact what it appeared to be in form). In other places, however, he treated the case as
containing the entire "business purpose" doctrine. Commissioner v. Transport Trading &
Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949) (Gregory requires business purpose for
transaction to be effective for tax purposes).
4 293 U.S. at 465, 470, 471.
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row holdings they are often wrong. Courts have been too quick to
recast transactions that in fact deserved the character assigned
them by the taxpayers. This in itself is not a serious problem, except for the taxpayers. A bad result in any given case is correctable
later as transactions become better understood and more carefully
managed. But there are also errors of principle in these cases, more
troublesome in their permanent effect.
A case that epitomizes this pattern is Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co.50 In that case, negotiations for the sale of a piece of
property by a corporation culminated in an oral agreement.5 1
When the parties met to reduce the agreement to writing, however,
the corporation's attorney advised the buyers that the sale could
not go through because of adverse tax consequences. Instead, the
corporation was liquidated the next day and its properties were
distributed to its shareholders in exchange for their stock; the
shareholders then sold the properties to the buyers on terms essentially the same as those previously negotiated with the corporation.
If the transaction could properly be regarded as a liquidation of
the corporation, followed by a sale of its properties by the shareholders, the corporate-level tax would be avoided. The Commissioner, however, insisted that the corporate-level tax be paid as
though the corporation had sold the property before the liquidation and had distributed the cash proceeds to the shareholders in
liquidation.52 The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner."
One can find in Court Holding a narrow decision, largely factual, sounding in the sham transaction doctrine. So conceived, the
Court's opinion merely asserts that, based on the overall record, no
actual liquidation of the company occurred before the sale and
that the sale was actually made by the corporation itself.5 As such,
there is nothing sinister about the Court Holding case. It is merely
324 U.S. 331 (1945).
, Id. at 333.
82 2 T.C. 531, 535 (1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
Under the tax laws then in effect, see I.R.C. § 115(c) (1939), the pattern insisted upon by
the Commissioner gave rise to taxable gain both for the corporation and the shareholders.
See 2 T.C. at 541.
11

324 U.S. at 333-34.

" Id. Court Holding can be read even more narrowly as a case on the scope of appellate
review of facts found by the Tax Court. The Tax Court "found" that the property had been
sold by the corporation, 2 T.C. at 537, an implausible finding on the record, but not beyond
belief. The Supreme Court might have concluded that the Tax Court's findings should be
disturbed only if patently wrong. See, e.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501-02
(1943) (Tax Court's findings of fact stand on review as long as there is a "rational basis" for
them in the record). So conceived, Court Holding might be correctly decided, although having nothing to do with form versus substance.
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wrong. On the facts as summarized by the Supreme Court (and
apparently found by the Tax Court) it is fairly plain that a liquidation really did occur.55 The conclusion would be different if, for
example, the corporation had in fact sold the property and the taxpayers, as an afterthought, had attempted to trump up a liquidation. The Court was apparently misled by the rapid succession of
events into thinking that a liquidation that briefly precedes a sale
is somehow less a liquidation than one that precedes it by a long
period, a notion readily dispelled upon reflection."
The Court was not satisfied with a narrow and wrong decision,
however. There is a larger aspect of Court Holding, far more difficult to state and limit. Starting from the proposition that "it]he
incidence of taxation depends on the substance of a transaction," 7
the opinion asserted that the "means employed to transfer a legal
title" cannot by themselves govern the tax consequences of a sale."
The liquidation of the corporation, in the Court's view, did nothing
more than set up the shareholders as a "conduit" for the passage
of title to the buyers, and as such could be disregarded as a "mere
formalism[]." 59
These propositions must have substantial superficial appeal,
because they are accepted by an overwhelming majority of tax lawyers. But they are not tenable. All that the liquidation of a corporation ever entails is a transfer of title in its assets. When an artifi5' Whether such an erroneous inference from the facts would require reversal is another
matter.
" Even here the Supreme Court's holding can be justified on the narrower ground that
findings of fact by the Tax Court should be respected as long as they are warranted by the
record, even though the conclusion the Tax Court drew can be shown to be wrong as a
practical matter. The Supreme Court has held that any latitude in resolving factual issues in
tax cases belongs to the Tax Court in its greater expertise, and that deference to those
findings is therefore due. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1943). This interpretation of Court Holding, of course, goes only to the scope of appellate review. See supra
note 54.
It is an essential aspect of Court Holding that because the agreement was oral, there
was no contract, enforceable against the corporation, to sell the property. There was thus no
assignment of a contract already in force from a corporation to its shareholders, who might
then be regarded as doing nothing more than fulfilling the corporation's obligations. Even in
such a case it would not be obvious that the corporation was the seller; however, this hypothesis has no bearing on Court Holding, in which the only enforceable sale was made by
the shareholders after liquidation.
On its narrow, factual basis, Court Holding was corrected in a later case, United States
v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), where the Supreme Court found, on
essentially indistinguishable facts, that liquidation and sale had occurred in the order urged
by the taxpayer.
324 U.S. at 334.
Id.
59 Id.
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cial entity disappears, there results a change in the form of
ownership of property. Indeed, it is hard to think of what else happens in a liquidation other than a change in the formal indicia of
ownership. 0 This central fact-that liquidations of corporations
are purely formal creatures of law-was apparently misunderstood
by the Supreme Court. There is no specific physical event to which
liquidations correspond. The same people may remain in control of
the same property both before and after. To describe the passage
of title pursuant to a liquidation as a "mere formalism" is to deny
in effect that there can ever be a "real" liquidation.
In order to avoid the reductio implicit in Court Holding, later
decisions61 and commentators 62 have derived a somewhat different
principle from the case. Court Holding is read to mean that the
"substance" of a transaction can be found in the negotiations leading up to it, that from these negotiations the essential character of
the transaction can be determined, and that once determined, it
can override both the formal mechanics and purported effect of the
transaction as structured by the parties. This is how the IRS's and
most tax lawyers now understand Court Holding." Lawyers routinely advise clients, once a corporation has taken a step or two
toward a transaction with another party, that any form of the same
transaction between the corporation's shareholders and the same
party may be imputed back to the corporation. If it turns out that
a transaction with the shareholders would bring better tax consequences, lawyers will frequently advise negotiating an entirely new
transaction, with a different party, for fear of the penumbras of
Court Holding. The lawyers may also stress how much difficulty
the client would have saved by consulting them earlier.
The notion that negotiations are somehow part of the "substance" of a transaction is baffling. Negotiations can go on interminably and lead to a transaction or none, as the case may be. At the

"In most states no conveyance is necessary;, title to properties automatically vests in
shareholders upon liquidation. See 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PuvATs
COPORATIONS § 8134 (rev. perm. ed. 1979).
61See, e.g., Waltham Netoco Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 399, 404-05, aff'd,

401 F.2d 333 (1st Cir. 1968).
2 See, e.g., Mintz, Recent Developments Under Court Holding and Cumberland Public Service Co. Cases-Sale of Assets or Stock, 11 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 873, 876-84 (1953).
43 See Rev. Rul. 69-172, 1969-1 C.B. 99.
Applied to the facts of Court Holding, this principle would no longer defeat the taxpayer. Section 337 eliminates recognition of gain by a liquidating corporation, regardless of

the order of liquidating and sale. LR.C. § 337 (West Supp. 1982). The principle of Court
Holding is still applied to recast transactions other than complete liquidations. E.g., Rev.
Rul. 69-172, 1969-1 C.B. 99.
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last minute the parties can storm out and war can ensue. In fact,
Court Holding could be invoked to show that the Trojan War
never was, or at least could be set aside as a sham, because it followed a series of negotiations tending to peace. However long the
negotiations, the parties can change their minds in an instant and
make a deal never before contemplated. Indeed, the longer the negotiations, the more likely the transaction actually consummated
will be different from any one previously canvassed by the parties.
On close scrutiny, the reasoning in Court Holding simply collapses. The case does hardly more than proceed directly from the
proposition that substance must prevail over form to the conclusion that the taxpayer's transaction cannot stand.
Although couched in the language of "form" and "substance,"
Court Holding has little to do with either of these things. Rather,
it requires that the Treasury not be deprived of the benefit of an
error that a taxpayer was about to make and corrected too late.
Although it is not immediately obvious what the Court meant by
"substance," in practice Court Holding called up a new set of
forms to replace those less appealing to the Court. If the negotiators of a transaction are careful to assert from the start on whose
behalf they negotiate, Court Holding can be tamed. Such an assertion is itself a formality and can be regarded as a Miranda warning
of sorts, necessary to make certain transactions operative under
subchapter C.
VI
Gregory and Court Holding encapsulate in the end an essentially aesthetic response to attempts by taxpayers thought unworthy of success. Both cases are, however, couched in the language, at
least, of traditional statutory interpretation. Gregory purports to
be striving for the meaning of the tax statute. Court Holding purports to lay bare what "really happened" in a transaction. A later
case, Goldstein v. Commissioner,5 took a large step in severing the
question of form and substance altogether from one of dissecting
transactions and the Internal Revenue Code.
Tillie Goldstein won $140,000 in the Irish Sweepstakes in
1958." Shortly thereafter she borrowed somewhat less than one
million dollars at four percent from banks, prepaying several years'
- 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
"Id. at 736.
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interest of $81,000 in cash. 7 With the loan proceeds she bought at
a discount one million dollars' worth of 1.5% United States treasury notes, with maturities of three and four years 8s The notes were
pledged as security for the bank loans. Mrs. Goldstein hoped that
the large interest prepayment would provide a deduction to offset
her sweepstakes winnings, while the interest she received on the
treasury notes would be reported annually. There was also the possibility of a capital gain upon retirement of the notes. What Mrs.
Goldstein attempted in effect was home-made income averaging
and deferral, but the plan would succeed only if the $81,000 in prepaid interest was deductible.
To the Tax Court the interest payments were a sham." It reasoned that the bank had, in fact, invested directly in the treasury
notes and had received from Mrs. Goldstein a fee for the service of
donning the facade of a lender.70 The Tax Court was almost surely
wrong on this point, and the Court of Appeals so found.71 Interest
on the bank loans really had been paid, the bank had no rights in
the treasury notes except as collateral, and it was nearly impossible
not to treat the indebtedness of Mrs. Goldstein as genuine.
Having restored the character of interest to the amount paid
by Mrs. Goldstein, the Court of Appeals was still not satisfied to
let her win the case. The overall borrowing and purchase of treasury notes held out quite slender prospects of an economic profit for
Mrs. Goldstein. The tax advantage of an interest deduction in the
year of the sweepstakes win obviously was the motivating force in
the transaction. Following the language of Gregory, the court could
conceivably have said that it was intrinsic to the concept of "interest" that its payment have some object other than reducing taxes,
and therefore that no "interest" had been paid. That would have
been somewhat hard to say, however, considering what came
before, and given that nothing in the statute indicates that the
term "interest" is taken with a special meaning. Instead, the court
said simply that this interest was not deductible.7 ' The court held
that interest could be deducted only if the underlying borrowing
arose from activity that could be called "purposive. 1 73 The adjective is somewhat startling, and one might have thought it entirely
- Id. at 736, 739.
" Id. at 736.
" Goldstein v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 284, 298 (1965).
70 Id. at 299.
71364 F.2d at 737-38.
71 Id. at 740.
73 Id. at 741.
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applicable to Mrs. Goldstein's desire to reduce taxes. But the court
explained that obtaining a tax deduction is not in itself purposive. 74 More is required, and whatever that is, Mrs. Goldstein did
not have it.
Goldstein has been understood (somewhat charitably) in later
cases7 5 and comnentaries 76 as embodying a specific refinement of
the business purpose doctrine. Starting from the suggestion in
Gregory that reducing taxes is not in itself a business purpose,
the doctrine posits that a transaction must have the inherent possibility of making a profit, entirely aside from tax effects, in order
to fall within Code provisions ostensibly applicable to it. For this
purpose, one imagines (although it is never stated), that the imputed income from consumption or ownership of property must be
deemed an aspect of "profit," or the interest deduction for all consumer borrowing would be struck down.
But even passing this problem, the difficulties with the doctrine are insuperable. Whole classes of transactions could be shown
to be uneconomical absent the effect of particular tax allowances.
For example, one of the principal advantages of home ownership is
the tax benefit of deductible mortgage interest coupled with the
exclusion of the imputed rental income from taxation. 8 In many
cases the purchase of a house with borrowed money is demonstrably uneconomical without this tax benefit, a benefit often fully discounted in the price of housing. Consistently applied, therefore,
the Goldstein doctrine would wipe out the deductibility of much
home mortgage interest-not such a bad result as a matter of policy, but not one commonly thought to be within the province of the
courts to bring on unilaterally. The particular ferocity of the outcome in Goldstein embodies no consistently applicable general
principle but, once again, an aesthetic response to a transaction
thought unappealing.79
VII
The cases on form and substance have come some distance
74
76
76

Id. at 741-42.
E.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 440, 463 (1977).
E.g., Warren, The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions,

59 TAXES 985, 986-91 (1981).

364 F.2d at 741-42.
I.R.C. § 163 (1976).
I am, happily, spared the need to say more to demonstrate the doctrinal infirmities of
Goldstein and its progeny because precisely such a demonstration has recently been made
in an excellent article. See Warren, supra note 76.
77

78
79
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past the simple attempt to distinguish genuine transactions from
shams. So uncertain are the broader doctrines drawn by the courts,
however, that the pattern of two-level holdings, adumbrated in
Gregory and Court Holding, has persisted. Where possible, courts
still try to cast transactions in disfavor as shams, before burying
them under pronouncements of more sweeping import.
The much-vexed case of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Com0 is an example. In that case the taxpayer (a corporamissioners
tion) sold the shares of a wholly owned subsidiary, in which its tax
basis was $700,000. The buyer originally offered $3,500,000 for the
shares. Not wanting a large capital gain of $2,800,000, the parent
corporation rejected the offer but countered with its own offer of a
sale for $700,000, to be preceded by a dividend distribution of
$2,800,000. The buyer accepted this proposal.81 The subsidiary distributed a $2,800,000 note to its parent as a "dividend" shortly
before the sale of its shares. Shortly after the sale, the buyer lent
the (now former) subsidiary of the taxpayer $2,800,000, which was
used to pay off the note.82
Dividends from a wholly owned subsidiary are normally taxfree to its parent.8 This explains the dividend distribution before
sale of the subsidiary's shares. The subsidiary, however, almost
surely had insufficient liquid assets actually to pay a $2,800,000
dividend in cash, which explains the distribution of a note. The
Tax Court found that a dividend had in fact been paid by the subsidiary to its parent before the sale of shares.8 The Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion laced with the language of form and
8
substance. 5
The narrow holding of the court was apparently that in "substance" no dividend had been paid and that the overall transaction
was a sale of the subsidiary's stock for $3,500,000. At this level the
opinion is unremarkable but, again, wrong. To be sure, the transaction was economically equivalent to a sale of shares for $3,500,000
before the dividend, but sales of shares are always at a price that
reflects the previous payment of dividends. It is true also that the
" 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
sl Id. at 1187-90.
" Id. at 1189-90.
SI.R.C. § 243 (West Supp. 1982).
" Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 650 (1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
- E.g., 430 F.2d at 1185, 1192 ("attempt by a taxpayer to ward off tax blows with paper
armor"; "economic substance"; "courts will look beyond the superficial formalities of a
transaction to determine the proper tax treatment").
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subsidiary probably did not have the ready cash to pay a
$2,800,000 dividend. But the creation of claims against corporate
assets in the form of debt instruments distributed to shareholders
has normally been treated by the IRS and the courts as a dividend.86 The succession of events was rapid rather than drawn out,
but that was hardly a reason for the individual steps to change
their character.
To its dissection of the taxpayer's specific transaction, the
court added a statement of general principle. To allow a tax-free
dividend would open "a new horizon of tax avoidance" by the circumvention of capital gains treatment "through a pre-sale extraction of earnings and profits.

' 87

The inevitable implication of this

principle is that there can never be a dividend distribution in close
proximity to a sale of shares.
The court's notion of what is necessary to prevent tax avoidance, assuming this to be a legitimate standard, is remarkable. The
profits of the subsidiary in Waterman Steamship had already been
taxed at the regular corporate tax rate for business profits. When
the parent was taxed on gain from the "sale" of its subsidiary's
shares, these profits were in effect taxed again in corporate solution. And the profits of the subsidiary could still be taxed as dividends upon their ultimate distribution to individual shareholders.
Thus a regime of potential triple taxation of the same profits was
found necessary by the court to prevent a "new horizon of tax
avoidance."
Curiously, the result sought by the taxpayer in Waterman
Steamship (and decried as a potential "new horizon" of abuse) was
unilaterally adopted by the IRS, four years before Waterman
Steamship was decided, in its 1966 revision of the regulations governing consolidated returns of parent and subsidiary corporations.88 To have respected the dividend distribution in Waterman
Steamship would have given the taxpayer the result now routinely
obtained under IRS regulations by parent corporations that sell
subsidiaries, a result denounced by no one as "tax avoidance." 89
8"

See, e.g., Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1947).

87 430 F.2d at 1195.
8

Compare Tress. Reg. § 1.1502-34A (1955) (generally no adjustment of parent's basis

for subsidiary's earnings and profits) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32, T.D. 7637, 1979-2 C.B.
311, 315 (parent's basis in stock of consolidated subsidiary increased by subsidiary's earnings and profits).
"oMany of the difficulties inherent in the Fifth Circuit's handling of Waterman Steamship are analyzed in Kingson, supra note 32. Kingson offers a powerful critique of the case,
but then appears to conclude that the true substance of the transaction should be found in
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VIII
It is easy enough to criticize, I suppose, and someone having
read this far might well ask how the courts could have done better
in unravelling form and substance in taxation. For one, they could
have paid less attention to the whole idea. More parsing of the
statute and specific transactions and less concern with how to save
the world from manipulative taxpayers would have led to sounder
holdings in all these cases.
The most important inquiry at the threshold is whether a statutory provision draws its meaning from the terms of the statute
itself or (and to what extent) from outside. When we are dealing
with statutory terms of art, the form-substance dichotomy is a
false one. "Substance" can only be derived from forms created by
the statute itself. Here substance is form and little else; there is no
natural law of reverse triangular mergers. The IRS should no more
be required to concede a near miss than a taxpayer to be denied
the benefit of a formally perfect transaction for want of moral
purity.
The harder problem is measuring transactions against statutory provisions that draw their content from life. The ultimate
question here is what it is that taxpayers have actually done. This
is a difficult sort of inquiry, which requires a grasp of transactions
in their complete setting.
Hard grappling with the facts of a case and the inner workings
of a statute, although both difficult and intellectually admirable, is
frequently passed off as a trivial or excessively "formal" exercise.
For one who has gotten that far, the slogan of "substance over
form" is as good a means as any to clear the intellectual landscape
for an inquiry about the "larger" nature of the statute itself. The
latter exercise is in fact quite easy, requiring only the assertion of a
statutory purpose that encapsulates one's own tastes, either generally or regarding the transaction under scrutiny.
As Professor Bittker points out, the enshrinement of substance over form has come to serve in the discourse of tax lawyers
and judges as a "maxim" of statutory construction." As with its
older relatives-or perhaps like a proto-language after generations
of etymological transformation-it is harder and harder to know
which way it will cut when it surfaces. Learned Hand himself once
the underlying negotiations, on the principle of Court Holding.Id. at 883-84. It seems to me
that Kingson replaces the approach taken by the court in Waterman Steamship with one
conceptually even less ,tenable. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
,* 1 B. BrrrKER, supra note 1, at 4-35 to 4-44.
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described "form" and "substance" as "anodynes for the pains of
reasoning." 1 In its recent manifestations in decided cases, the slogan has become as much a means of blunting the thrust of the
statute as promoting it.
A justification frequently offered for extrastatutory or remedial forays by the courts in tax cases is that the tax laws cannot
possibly reach all the artful forms of transaction used by taxpayers
to reduce taxes and, therefore, that the courts have an important
function in filling gaps left open by an imperfectly expressed congressional intent. 2 Few myths so persistent are as easily dispelled.
It is hard to think of a single case that has ever permanently
staunched any fissure in the congressional dyke.
None of the cases reviewed here forestalled the necessity to
change the law. Some even required specific corrective responses
against their own holdings from Congress and the IRS. Neither the
IRS nor the courts need rely on the highly metaphorical language
of Gregory,to prevent dividend distributions from taking on the
guise of corporate separations, because the Code has been specifically amended to require first, that the shares received by wouldbe Mrs. Gregorys represent ownership of an active business undertaking with a five-year history, 8 and second, that the overall transaction not be a "device" for the distribution of profits." The result
in Court Holding so little comported with desirable tax policy that
the outcome of the case in its original setting was reversed by Congress in the 1954 Code.9 5 The IRS was forced to repudiate the
principle underlying its victory in Waterman Steamship when it
became apparent that it favored the taxpayer in cases where individuals rather than parent corporations received distributions from
corporations before the sale of their shares." The IRS has retreated to the position that Waterman Steamship is a pure sham
transaction case, which it certainly is not.97
11 Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667
(1932).
r E.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 887 n.27 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
,3I.R.C. § 335(a)(1)(b) & (c) (West Supp. 1982).
Id. § 355(a)(1)(B).

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 337, 68A Stat. 1, 106 (1954) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 337 (West Supp. 1982)).
" See Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379, 395, 398 (5th Cir. 1971) (Waterman
"

Steamship applied to distributions received by individual shareholders); Rev. Rul. 75-493,
1975-2 C.B. 109 (IRS will not follow Casner, Waterman Steamship distinguished as "sham"

case).
'7

See supra text accompanying note 86.
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The Goldstein case best illustrates the fecklessness of judicial
attempts to make the law "better" by designing it in response to
the affairs of a single taxpayer. The perceived abuse in Goldstein
stemmed principally from two causes. The first was the deduction
claimed for prepaid interest, at that time not barred by the Internal Revenue Code. Certainly, the prepayment of several years' interest could be regarded conceptually as a capital expenditure, being the cost of producing the right to use borrowed funds for a
period of years. Arguably, then, a deduction should be only ratably
allowed. Offsetting this is the fact that the taxpayer has actually
parted with the interest and that the lender must recognize income
immediately.9 8 The other major problem with the Goldstein transaction was the creation of a current interest deduction against ordinary income for the cost of holding an asset that, by virtue of
accruing unrealized appreciation, would produce gains both deferred and partly taxed at lower capital gains rates.
Quite possibly these two problems were defects in the tax system. But it certainly was not within the reach of a single decision
like Goldstein to cure them. The tax result sought by Tillie Goldstein has been prevented independently by at least two subsequent
statutory changes. One is a limitation on the deduction of interest
on borrowings used to carry investment assets.99 The other is a requirement that prepaid interest be deducted ratably over the full
period of a borrowing. 1°° Either rule alone would have stopped Tillie Goldstein. It is inconceivable that Congress could have been
spared the trouble of amending the law by the generalized requirement of a "purposive" transaction asserted in Goldstein. The net
effect of Goldstein was therefore not to improve the law in a way
that voided the need for further statutory overlays, but simply to
penalize one Tillie Goldstein for having thought that she could rely
on a clearly stated Code provision allowing a deduction for "interest," 101 which no one denied that she paid.
The sort of "creative" jurisprudence found in the cases on
form and substance cannot, in the end, be justified by any demonstrable needs of sound tax administration. It has, however, become
the norm, and one wonders why.
9, Indeed, objections to prepaid interest might also invalidate the allocation of large
amounts of interest to the early payments of a mortgage.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 227, 83 Stat. 487, 574 (current version
at I.R.C. § 163(d) (West Supp. 1982)).
1'0 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 208, 90 Stat. 1520, 1541-42 (codified
at I.R.C. § 461(g) (1976)).
101 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1976).
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One reason is that judges have aspirations. Little attention is
drawn to those who hew narrowly to technical rules. The painstaking process of examining transactions and statutes to determine
whether they concord promises little glory. In a society that has
always looked to courts for strokes of statesmanship, it is easy
enough to understand a judge's temptation to cut through, rather
than unravel, the Gordian knot. A simpler variant of this attitude
is the desire not to look naive, to understand what is "really going
on." Many of the judges who have written opinions in this area
display the tone of one who wants very much not to be taken in.
A recent Tax Court case, Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner,10 2 is both amusing and unnerving in its surrender to this
tendency. The underlying issues are unimportant, because it little
matters whether the court was right or wrong. A concurring opinion contains the following thoughts:
All the members of the Court recognize that the tax avoidance
scheme of Arthur Condiotti and his accountant-tax adviser,
William P. Barlow, cannot be allowed to stand. It is an obvious attempt, and a somewhat crude attempt, lacking in legitimate business purposes, to spread large anticipated sums of
ordinary income among several taxpayer[s] . . . . The only
disagreement among the members of the Court is how best to
set aside the tax avoidance scheme.1 03
The opinion then goes on to scourge the taxpayer with a variety of
epithets. 4 Six judges agreed with this concurrence. To be sure,
neither Learned Hand nor Hugo Black would ever have written
such words into an opinion, but it is also hard to imagine that any
judge would feel licensed to follow a pure gut response in deciding
a tax dispute if Gregory and Court Holding had gone the other
way.
On the whole, law professors do not help much either. It is
their wont to decry "formalism" and glorify the ends of "policy" in
the resolution of disputes. It is not uncommon for professors to
regard-and teach-the process of legal interpretation as a vehicle
for their own aesthetic preferences, which cover the range from allocative efficiency to distributive justice. Whatever the merits of
this style of legal analysis in general, in tax matters it is a fertile
69 T.C. 119 (1977).
o Id. at 130-31 (Goffe, J., concurring).
104 Id. at 133 ("not acquired in a bona fide transaction"; "scheme to avoid tax"); id. at
102

134 ("reek with suspicion"); id. at 137 ("flunked all of the tests").
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source of bad law.
If not the taxpaying public or the fisc, who ultimately benefits
from this approach? The only unequivocal beneficiary is the tax
bar. The heavier the layers of judicial divination superimposed on
the Internal Revenue Code, the richer tax lawyers are apt to get.
The development of an exquisite set of intuitions about what kinds
of transactions the courts "like" and "don't like" has become a
large part of what tax lawyers sell.
After Court Holding, a lawyer could with a certain smug veracity tell a client who had thought it a good idea to save taxes by
liquidating a company before a sale, "You should have called me
months ago-now you're in trouble." Indeed, it would not take too
many cases like Court Holding to justify the injunction not to take
a deep breath without calling a tax lawyer.
Some of this is inevitable. Clients will rarely read the tax laws
or the decided cases as accurately as their counsel and will always
have some reason to fear that they may have missed something. To
the extent that every transaction has to run the gauntlet of an array of extrastatutory standards, however, tax lawyers' contribution
to the GNP deflator will be all the greater.
To be sure, all of this matters less than war or famine, and we
shall all manage to lurch along even with this additional dead
weight on our tax system. Still, I believe that if Gregory had gone
the other way (and all that that entails had ensued), we would now
have a more readily fathomable demarcation between the respective spheres of statutory provisions and judicial intuition.
Ix
Remembering my starting point, I should add that it was
not-nor should it have been-Professor Bittker's mandate to
scour the tax cases for unsound pronouncements. The most important function of a tax treatise is to aid in giving advice. And there
is no denying that tax lawyers must, in advising their clients, heed
every one of the cases examined here, notwithstanding the sort of
misgivings an academic reviewer might muster.
Overall, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts serves
the ends of tax lawyers so well that with it Professor Bittker has
cemented his already immense reputation. Another actor in this
story, however, now mostly forgotten, also deserves a word of
praise-a word necessarily directed to his heirs. It was Judge
Sternhagen of the Board of Tax Appeals who, in the original opinion in Gregory, made the clearest and most defensible statement I
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have yet encountered on the subject of form and substance in
taxation. 10 5

105See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.

